

The Void Galloped Into Cloud Street: Wittgenstein and Early Mahāyāna Buddhism on Expressing Transcendental Ideas

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This paper concerns language and specifically, it concerns language that may be used in any attempt to express transcendental ideas, that is, to express ideas that at their core concern objects, qualities, events, or Being(s) that are posited to exist "beyond the world," which generally means beyond that which we circumscribe as the empirical world. Undeniably, Ludwig Wittgenstein has been an important and seminal voice in 20th century Anglo-American theories of language. It seems equally clear that the developmental thesis concerning Wittgenstein's work—namely that over time several more or less distinct periods in his thought can be reasonably distinguished—is the correct way of understanding the otherwise contradictory ideas which could be culled from the full body of his writing. However, there remains throughout these changing phases a persistent concern with how to properly understand the nature and function of language. Wittgenstein's earliest attempts at finding answers to these questions, relying upon a metaphysical account of reality as simply empirical (consisting only of "facts,") resulted in a strict separation of expressions into the *sensical* and the *nonsensical* on the basis of their relation to that reality and the subsequent conclusion that any attempt to put into words that which is not of the empirical world is doomed to failure. The answer to the question whether natural language can meaningfully express "supernatural" concepts was thus, for young Wittgenstein, an unequivocal "No."

While in later years, Wittgenstein modified his views, allowing a greater elasticity to language than what he earlier viewed as plausible, it is the spirit of his earlier writings which seems to prevail among many Western analytic philosophers to this day. It is for this reason that

I have chosen to focus on Wittgenstein's earlier position and so the initial thesis under consideration is this: *Words can express nothing that is higher*.¹ One consequence of this view is that all ethical and religious language, indeed all philosophical language, must in the end be deemed, however "lamentably," nonsensical. This result is naturally unsatisfactory to those of us who persist in speaking of axiology and religion. Are our hands so firmly and irrevocably tied? Are all of the accounts of theologians and philosophers who speak of things which are not easily captured in scientific language merely babbling and waving their hands? I argue that this conclusion need not be considered inevitable.

There are indications in the early Mahāyāna Buddhist literature of a theory of language powerful enough to provide the means for our finite words to successfully communicate "infinite concepts." Edward Hamlin, drawing upon the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, has suggested a particularly rich reading of this theory, in which he explicates a notion of leading concepts or nominal pointers as means by which words can lead one to grasp transcendental ideas indirectly by functioning as a sort of springboard-simile, a process of signifying through "likening unto."² My intention is to show that while both early Wittgenstein and Mahāyāna Buddhists recognized the limitation of empirical language to signify directly anything like an absolute idea or transcendental concept, nevertheless, Wittgenstein's worry about the failure of absolute terms to correspond directly to anything in the empirical world may be circumvented by the Mahāyāna view of language as capable of expressing transcendental ideas through indirect signification. This is possible even given Wittgenstein's expressed concern regarding the allegedly vacuous function of religious simile.

I. Wittgenstein on the Nonsensicality of Transcendental Expressions

...[I]f a man could write a book about Ethics which was really a book on ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world.³

While Wittgenstein never provided an exhaustive account of his views concerning ethical and religious language, his "Lecture on Ethics" and portions of the *Tractatus* provide general outlines of his early ideas.⁴ First, a "thinkable" state of affairs is a fact which we can picture to ourselves and a proposition is a linguistic picture of such a fact. For a proposition to "have a sense" is for it to picture reality by representing a possible state of affairs in the world and for it to "show its sense" is for it to display what things would then be like if the proposition were indeed true. For a proposition to lack sense is for there to exist nothing in the empirical world which corresponds to it. Thus nonsensical propositions are explained to "show that they say nothing," as they do not represent any thinkable and thus no expressible, state of affairs in the world.

Relative or "trivial" senses of concepts such as good, right, etc., are distinguished from their absolute senses. Relative values correspond to contingent facts, instrumental ends and a posteriori truths; absolute values—the concern of ethics and religion—correspond to necessary facts, ends-in-themselves and *a priori* truths.⁵ Although all judgments of relative value are analyzable into "mere statements of fact," no such statement "can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value."⁶ What would make such a value non-contingent cannot be located in the empirical world, since it would in that case have to be itself contingent;⁷ neither can it be deemed a property adhering to an individual's state of mind⁸ or to her will.⁹ It must be, rather, something transcendental or supernatural, "existing outside of the whole sphere of what happens and is the case."¹⁰

...[T]he absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody... would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of any absolute judge.¹¹

If the mere possibility of a thought or proposition ensured its truth, then it would be true *a priori*; however, as propositions in our language can be true only with respect to contingent facts and as the world is said to be the totality only of such facts, the referents of any absolute concepts are simply not found in the world and thus there are no propositions which can actually be true *a priori*.¹²

Consequently, Wittgenstein asserted that "[e]thics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute[ly] valuable, can be no science,"¹³ that what it says "does not add to our knowledge in any sense,"¹⁴ precisely because such expressions lack sense. Since ethics and religion are "supernatural if... anything at all," while our language can "only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water if [one] were to pour out a gallon over it,"¹⁵ ethico-religious concepts are inherently inexpressible in any meaningful way, as one "cannot use language to go beyond the possibility of evidence."¹⁶ This situation is not alleviated by the argument that ethico-religious concepts may be expressed through similes. Indeed, this "characteristic misuse of language"¹⁷ is ultimately vacuous, since "... a simile must be a simile for something," but in this case "...as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply state the [contingent, relative] facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts."¹⁸

In the same way, questions of absolute value must be understood as nonsensical, because their answers are to be found nowhere in experience— "the solution of the riddle of space and time lies outside space and time"— and thus cannot be answered at all.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Wittgenstein acknowledged that we still feel compelled to ask such questions:

The urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem will not be touched at all. Of course in that case there are no questions anymore; and that is the answer.²⁰

The "problem of life" is the tension between our desire to seek answers to such questions and the lamentable but inescapable fact that they cannot be answered. Indeed, a paradox lies in the very idea that a contingent fact or experience "should seem to have a supernatural value."²¹ The suggested solution to this paradoxical tension lies in its dissolution; hence, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."²²

II. The Early Mahāyāna Assessment of the Problem of Language

The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (henceforth, "the LS") is a seminal piece of Mahāyāna literature and it is with reference to this work and its treatment by early figures such as Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school and Nāgārjuna of the Mādhyamika school to which I am referring when I speak of the early [Indian] Mahāyāna theory of language.²³ First, on this theory, to assume the intrinsic reality of names or their meanings is to be guilty of "over-affirmation," to borrow a phrase from A. N. Whitehead, that is: the attribution of some special ontological, epistemological, or logical status to something which does not warrant it.²⁴ This sort of judgment was rendered in reaction to the Theravādin view that meaning is something actual and existent on its own, something which an expression either possesses or does not possess, like a quality. The Theravādin account was deemed a version of naive realism in the LS. As D.T. Suzuki explains: "...Names are not real things, they are merely symbolical [*saṃketa*]..., they are not worth getting attached to as realities."²⁵ Names, along with cognitive concepts, are said on the Mahāyāna theory to be the natural co-product of discriminative consciousness. The existence of name-and-form *qua* any particular object of perception or thought is contingent, dependent and conditioned; this means

that no such object— whether linguistic (e.g., a name), epistemological (e.g., a concept), psycho-spiritual (e.g., a disposition), or empirical (e.g. a bucket of water)— exists necessarily, independently, or in any sense absolutely.

... [I]f things existed by virtue of their own intrinsic nature, they would exist even without causes and conditions. But they do not. Therefore they have no intrinsic nature and they are called empty.²⁶

Gone, then, is the ancient Vedic notion that words are direct manifestations of the Divine, as well as the doctrine that words may contain as a self-evident "own-characteristic" [*svalakṣāna*] or essential quality some independent, transcendent, objectively existent meaning.

So what is the effective scope of language in a non-realist view? This question is of real importance to the Mahāyāna, ostensibly committed as they are to the enlightenment of other sentient creatures (which would seem to necessitate the ability to somehow convey meaningfully to others ideas concerning the path to enlightenment). A good deal is implied from fundamental doctrine, including: (1) that language serves as the natural linguistic counterpart of discursive conceptualization itself and as such can express only what is "thinkable" or "mentally cognizable"; and (2) that whatever could be the subject of religious expression (e.g. with reference to *Nirvāṇa*) must "lie beyond" the names and concepts which result from our ordinary discriminative interpretation of our experience in the empirical realm.

The referents of religious expressions should correspond to Truth, genuine and complete knowledge of which would be tantamount to Wisdom [*bodhi*] or Enlightenment. The ontological correlate should be Reality Itself. But there seems to be *prima facie* no immediate means by which we could conceptualize, much less express, such subjects. As Suzuki comments:

The truth [*tattva*] is elusive, beyond specification or logical definition. To be truth it must transcend all limitations of human thought. This is the core of the Mahāyāna doctrine of truth....²⁷

This poses no minor problem, which is formulated in the literature in a number of ways. the LS says at one point that:

Further, Mahātma, word-discrimination cannot express the highest reality, for external objects with their multitudinous individual marks are non-existent and only appear before us as something revealed out of Mind itself.²⁸

The Mādhyamika interpretation of such passages leads to a remorseless use of the *via negativa* principle upon language (as modified by Nāgārjuna), operating on the tenet that, as Mervyn Sprung phrases it: "Language must be as afflicted... as all other elements on the natural scene. It can hardly be used to uncover truth. It has no revelatory power...."²⁹ Further, on this view, there is:

... [N]othing in man's nature which could infuse meaning, other than empirically generated meaning, into human language. There is no Upanishadic immanent Brahman, no Platonic memory of the forms of Being....³⁰

In terms of the metaphysical system which originates in the LS, Nāgārjuna thus emphasizes the "voidness" of phenomena [*sūnyatā*] over its "thatness" [*tathatā*]. Beyond this point, scholarly opinion diverges as to what exactly Nāgārjuna's project then becomes with respect to language. One relatively recent line of thought, as found in Sprung and Eckel, is that language and the concepts expressed by language serve to somehow "bind together" what would otherwise be a disconnected and meaningless influx of phenomena [*dharmas*], so that we can move about "with practical effectiveness in it."³¹ In other words, the suggestion made is that Nāgārjuna finally settled upon a pragmatic theory of language which rests upon a special sort of coherence theory of expression.³² The rest seems to settle into Silence, as language is restricted only to expressing what is relative to the dependently arisen world of our experience. In this last respect alone, the Mādhyamikas seem very much to endorse the kind of view expressed by the younger Wittgenstein centuries later and half a world away.

It is worth noting that attempts to "go beyond" the boundaries of this silence by means of "non-linguistic" or "non-cognitive" or "non-discriminative" expression do appear in the early Mahāyāna literature. In fact, the LS itself contains the following passage, with reference to how such an expression might be manifested:

First, there are words without objects, that is, empty words such as hare's horns, tortoise's hair and barren woman's child. Second, worlds are not available in the real worlds [i.e. "realms" in which the world is perceived "as it really is"], the Buddha-lands..., where ideas are expressed by looking steadily, by gestures, by a frown, movement of the eyes, laughing, yawning, by clearing the throat, by recollection, or by trembling.³³

This approach, developed into an art in the later Ch'an school, is intriguing and perhaps genuinely closer to the spirit of the canonical doctrine developed in the name of the historical Buddha. However, it is not quite the positive doctrine sought here with respect to how language itself (as opposed to non-linguistic substitutes) might successfully indicate the meaning of transcendental or absolute concepts.

Perhaps it is on the Yogācārin view, in which "emptiness" is interpreted in a radically different way (to stave off the possibility of nihilism), that the kernel of a more positive linguistic doctrine might be formulated. I do not wish here to over-emphasize the Mādhyamika/Yogācāra divergence on this count, however, as a general reading of Mahāyāna doctrine in light of modern scholarship should suffice to outline the most important concept for a positive theory of language, to wit: that words as formal instruments should be carefully distinguished from the content of linguistic expressions, in order to understand how a contingent, "finite," and dependent construct might be used to successfully indicate a necessary, "infinite," and independent Truth.

As Chris Gudmunsen proposes, "Too much respect for the tools as independent objects detracts from their usefulness. We are liable to project distinctions between words on to the

world as absolute distinctions...."³⁴ Rather, "meaning," as contrasted with the words that convey it, is explained in the LS as something which is revealed by means of language, but not something which itself inheres in words.

... [M]eaning is entered into the world as things (revealed) by a lamp. ... It is... like a man carrying a lamp to look after his property. (By means of this light) he can say: This is my property....³⁵

Gudmunsen suggests in his analysis of these and similar passages that words (like lamps) "are revelatory when used; they are both tools."³⁶ This understanding of the early Mahāyāna theory of language to be in an important sense instrumental appears to be the consensus among scholars treating the subject.³⁷ What the following idea from Hamlin promises, in its essential features, is some reason for supposing that language qua instrument can function successfully to express what is essentially non-empirical.

III. A Syncretic Notion: Language Which Points to the Moon

Edward Hamlin has offered an intriguing analysis of what he deems the "deconstruction of language" in the LS, an analysis in which he develops the notion of a leading concept. Such concepts are manifested by words in certain capacities such that they point to "a reality beyond language altogether"— reality "as it really is" and thus in its Absolute aspect— while at the same time not concealing the fact that they are, after all, "merely words" which are not themselves real existents.³⁸ While Mervyn Sprung also makes mention of leading concepts with respect to the Mādhyamika interpretation of the LS, he does not develop this notion to any extent after helpfully suggesting that:

Words are guides, they preserve proven ways of coping with things. They are, to risk a neologism, ductile or ductational.³⁹ A name suggests a way.⁴⁰

Hamlin's deconstructive language thesis presents the possibility that words may refer to things "as they really are" by suggesting that a genuinely expressive stage of language use may be attained once the objects of language are "stripped so thoroughly of their usual meanings that they verge on... non-sense."⁴¹

Hamlin argues that the linguistic aspect of the Mahāyāna reversion of consciousness correlates to seeing things as they are in truth and that this reversion can be understood in terms of five successive stages.⁴² In the first or naive stage of language, one places her faith in the possibility that natural language can describe the world as it is really is. However, as soon as one realizes, upon reflection, that "what we thought was a description was actually an illusion," one then begins "to think that concepts are only analogous to the world— as in similes...."⁴³ Thus the second or analogical stage of language involves the *sublation* of the naive faith previously placed in language with the realization that it simply cannot correspond directly to anything which is not contingent, relative and worldly. Expressions of anything necessary, absolute and transcendental are then attempted by means of analogical language. All of this hearkens directly to Wittgenstein's general, early account of the limits of natural language and his particular criticism of the ultimate vacuity of religious similes. In the third or hermetic stage, it is realized that natural language cannot even by analogy express anything which is necessary or absolute; it is at this point that "silence" becomes the only apparent option.

But in Hamlin's scheme, the sound of silence is not the last thing one hears. Rather, in the fourth or nominal stage of the reversion of consciousness, the possibility of successful signification of transcendental concepts is restored with the introduction of the leading concept. Language in this stage is reduced to a series of nominal pointers, such that once the attempt to directly describe reality is finally abandoned, all that then remains is the "linguistic gesture," or a

"signal directed towards indicating or signifying insight, [but] not containing it conceptually."⁴⁴

It is this stage which is of particular importance to the present project. The final stage, which one enters upon attaining insight, is the expressive phase in which language becomes "a direct emanation of the enlightened state, a creative medium in the highest sense."⁴⁵

Hamlin does not expound at any length on this last phase and while it is intriguing, its possibilities extend beyond what is strictly needed for the central argument of this paper: that one can hold a view of language similar to that found in both early Mahāyāna Buddhism and the early Wittgenstein— with particular reference to its limits as a means of directly describing ultimate reality— without having to accept the conclusion that, in the end, all attempts at religious or ethical expression must lapse into fundamental silence. Towards this end, I suggest the following amplification of Hamlin's description of the fourth stage of the reversion of consciousness, with particular emphasis on the idea of indirect signification.

Returning again to Sprung's notion of the ductal quality of language, the ability to act as a conduit for ideas, I am reminded of the old Buddhist adage about pointing to the moon. As I might, say, point to the moon through a window in order to bring someone to the concept of "moon" for the first time, it is not my own pointing finger which I intend that person to grasp, but rather the moon. That is, my pointing finger is (like my words) simply an instrument of my expression, related only to my intended conceptual object through its contingent function as a "pointer unto" it in some particular set of circumstances. If it is the moon which I intend my observer (or listener, in the case of spoken words) to grasp *qua* a concept of the moon itself, it is not even the visual content of the window itself— however narrowly circumscribed (i.e., such that distractions such as "night sky" and "stars" are removed from consideration and only something like "big silver orb" remains)— to which I am referring, except indirectly, as conduit

to the idea which I do wish to stimulate in the mind of the observer. This visual content ("big silver orb") can then serve as a kind of second pointer to the concept of "moon"— indicating not merely the moon as it appears to either of us at some time, but rather exciting the concept of moon in a non-relative sense, as moon *per se*— irrespective of its particular, contingent and various states (e.g., visible only as a half-moon, hanging low and orange in the sky, covered by fleeting clouds, etc.).

As a painter... arrays his colours in order to produce a painting, so do I preach, the picture is not in the colour, not in the canvas, nor in the palate. In order to attract all beings, the picture is produced in colours; preaching may err, but the truth is beyond words."⁴⁶

Poets understand intimately this function of language; they know all too well how, for instance, scientific expression, however valuable in numerous areas of human life, falls so completely short of capturing our experiences and ideas in other areas. This fact certainly need not entail that whatever cannot be said scientifically cannot be said at all, much less that it is not really worth saying. The failure, rather, should be taken as indicative of the fact that language may simply have to be adapted in different ways for different kinds of expression. If it is understood that language may signify successfully by acting, not necessarily as concept-descriptor, but sometimes instead as concept-provoker, then the "how" of other, non-scientific modes of expression should become evident enough to allow that, after all, we can speak meaningfully of that which we can circumscribe with our words only indirectly and hence speak meaningfully of transcendental ideas. §

Notes

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1922; reprinted 1978): 6.42.

² Edward Hamlin, "Discourse in the *Lankāvatāra-Sūtra*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 11 (1983), pp. 302-3.

³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lecture on Ethics" in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951*. Editors James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), p. 7.

⁴ Most of his writing on the subject seems to have occurred during World War I (see Notebooks circa 1916) and shortly thereafter (see the *Tractatus*, 1921), as well as during his first academic year as a lecturer at Cambridge (1929-30, see "'Lecture on Ethics'"). A few brief remarks towards the end of his life are to be found in such sources as 1945's *Philosophical Investigations* and his unfinished 1949-51 manuscript "On Certainty".

It is tempting to engage in a bit of reconstructive speculation concerning what may have let loose Wittgenstein's pen with respect to ethics on those rare occasions when he did discuss it. It has been suggested by some that Wittgenstein's experiences during World War I (for which he volunteered) so deeply affected him that he had, as so many others who lived in the trenches, a life-transforming experience of a profoundly existential nature; it thus seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that this experience influenced his thinking about morality and religion. I hesitate somewhat to speculate on his precise motivation for the 1929-30 discourse on ethics, yet cannot help but wonder if the exhilaration of returning to Cambridge, not as Bertrand Russell's student, but as a lecturer, in the wake of the positive acceptance of his *Tractatus*, might have encouraged him to address topics which he might not have otherwise felt that he could. As for the snippets available from the end of Wittgenstein's life, I ask-- as the certainty of his death from cancer grew near, might he not have naturally been drawn back to ideas of the "mystical" sort he had, in accordance with his own creed, largely left undiscussed since their first appearances? As it was, he did not quite burst into profuse narratives on the subject of morality and God, even at this late time in his life, but offered only passing references in the course of such works as *Philosophical Investigations*.

⁵ "Lecture on Ethics," pp. 5-6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.6.

⁷ *Tractatus* 6.41.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Tractatus* 6.423: "It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes."

¹⁰ See *Tractatus* 6.41 as well as the "Lecture on Ethics" pp. 7 and 10.

¹¹ "Lecture on Ethics," p. 7.

¹² *Tractatus*.

¹³ "Lecture on Ethics," p. 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ "Lecture on Ethics," p. 7.

¹⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*. Editor Rush Rhees. Translators Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975), p. 55: 7.

¹⁷ "Lecture on Ethics," p. 9.

¹⁸ "Lecture on Ethics," p. 10

¹⁹ *Tractatus* 6.4312

²⁰ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks, 1914-6* cited in Cyril Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*. (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 73, section 51.

²¹ "Lecture on Ethics," p. 10.

²² *Tractatus* 7.

²³ The schism in the Buddhist schools which resulted in the Theravāda/Mahāyāna split is said to have developed circa 100 C.E. The Theravāda branch represents the older of the two traditions, in which emphasis is placed upon the individual's attainment of *arhathood* or enlightenment. The name "Hinayāna," meaning "inferior-" or "lesser-vehicle" is a pejorative formulated by the Mahāyāna -- whose own name means "Greater Vehicle"-- to distinguish themselves from the Theravāda school of the patriarchs. The new movement espoused the bodhisattva ideal, the view that it is not enough to attain enlightenment for oneself alone, but that in order to achieve the highest perfection she must actively work to bring about the enlightenment (and thus the liberation) of other sentient creatures.

During its formative years, Yogācāra's key figures were Maitreya (third century CE) and Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both fourth century CE). The exact relationship between these figures is unclear. Some say that

Maitreya is to Aśaṅga as Socrates is to Plato, more of a historical influence than an active contributor to what became the Yogācārin philosophy. Others put that relationship in reverse, making Aśaṅga the “fictional character.” It is sometimes reported that Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu were half-brothers, and that the former served as teacher and mentor to the latter upon his conversion to Mahāyāna from a Hīnayāna sect. To complicate matters further, there is a line of historical interpretation which asserts that there were *two* individuals named Vasubandhu, both of whom wrote from the Mahāyāna perspective and lived at roughly the same time.

²⁴ See Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*. This notion is closely tied to the doctrine shared widely by classical Indian schools (not only Buddhist, but also e.g. Advaita Vedāntin) concerning “superimposition” (*samāropa*). Superimposition is the “overlaying” of something which conceals the truth, an obscuring of truth or accuracy. The remedial counterpart to superimposition is “sublation,” or the substitution of a (more) accurate statement for a (relatively) erroneous one.

²⁵ D.T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra*. (Original publication, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1930. Reprinted 1975), p. 156.

²⁶ Nāgārjuna's *Viśgrahavyavartani* 22, cited in Malcolm D. Eckel, “Bhavaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theories of Language.” *Philosophy East and West* Vol. 28, No. 3 (July 1978): p. 325. With regard to these two statements, the Yogācārin are in agreement as well.

²⁷ Suzuki, p. 173.

²⁸ Cited in Chris Gudmunsen, *Wittgenstein and Buddhism* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1977), p. 57.

²⁹ Mervyn Sprung, “Non-Cognitive Discourse in Mādhyamika Buddhism” in *Indian Philosophy and Religion*.

Editor Harold G. Coward. (Canadian Society for the Study of Religion Supplements No. 5, 1978), p. 44.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Sprung, p. 46.

³² See Eckel, pp. 324-5.

³³ *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* in Suzuki.

³⁴ Gudmunsen, p. 59.

³⁵ Text as related by Gudmunsen, *ibid*.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Including Suzuki, Eckels and Sprung.

³⁸ Hamlin, pp. 302-3.

³⁹ According to the *American Heritage Dictionary*, “duct” refers to a “passage through which something is conveyed” and is derived from the Latin ductus, or “an act of leading.” “Ductile” refers to the capability of a thing to be easily shaped or influenced and is derived from the Latin ductilis, or “part of” and from the French decere, or “to lead.”

⁴⁰ Sprung, page 47.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Hamlin, pp. 302-3.

⁴³ The “reversion of consciousness” is a term which originates in the LS and was developed to some length by the Yogācārin. It refers to the successive stages of the sublation of false views to the relatively true, and then again the gradual sublation of the relatively true to Absolute Truth, necessary to enlightenment. Ontologically speaking, the objects of these truth are respectively (i) unreal, “in no sense is it true or actual”, (ii) contingently real and unreal, “in some senses it is true and actual and in some senses it is not, both in accordance with circumstances,” and (iii) the “really” real, or “that which is always and necessary true and actual.”

⁴⁴ Hamlin, p. 302.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* 116-9 in Suzuki, p. 174.